Abstract. We describe a fragment of the hardware description language VHDL that is suitable for implementing the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm. We then define an Information Flow analysis as required by the international standard Common Criteria. The goal of the analysis is to identify the entire information flow through the VHDL program. The result of the analysis is presented as a non-transitive directed graph that connects those nodes (representing either variables or signals) where an information flow might occur. We compare our approach to that of Kemmerer and conclude that our approach yields more precise results.
Introduction
Modern technical equipment often depends on the reliable performance of embedded systems. The present work is part of an ongoing effort to validate the security properties of such systems. Here it is a key requirement that the programs maintain the confidentiality of information it handles. To document this, an evaluation against the criteria of the international standard Common Criteria [13] is a main objective.
In this paper we focus on the Covert Channel analysis described in Chapter 14 of [13] . The main technical ingredient of the analysis is to provide a description of the direct and indirect flows of information that might occur. This is then followed by a further step where the designer argues that all information flows are permissible -or where an independent code evaluator asks for further clarification. We present the result of the analysis as a directed graph: the nodes represent the resources, and there is a direct edge from one node to another whenever there might be a direct or indirect information flow from one to the other. In general, the graph will be non-transitive [4, 14] .
The programming language used is the hardware description language VHDL [7] . Systems consist of a number of processes running in parallel where each process has its own local data space and communication between processes is performed at synchronization points using signals. In Section 2 we give an overview of the fragment VHDL 1 . We present a formal Semantics of VHDL 1 in Section 3.
The problem of analysing VHDL programs has already been addressed in previously published approaches. The paper by Hymans [6] uses abstract interpretation to give an over-approximation of the set of reachable configurations for a fragment of VHDL not unlike ours. This suffices for checking safety properties: if the safety property is true on all states in the over-approximation it will be true for all executions of the VHDL program. Hence when synthesizing the VHDL specification one does not need to generate circuits for enforcing the reference monitor (called an observer in [6] ).
The paper by Hsieh and Levitan [5] considers a similar fragment of VHDL and is concerned with optimising the synthesis process by avoiding the generation of circuits needed to store values of signals. One component of the required analyses is a Reaching Definitions analysis with a similar scope to ours although specified in a rather different manner. Comparing the precision of their approach (to the extent actually explained in the paper) with ours, we believe that our analysis is more precise in that it allows also to kill signals being set in other processes than where they are used. Furthermore the presented analysis is only correct for processes with one synchronization point, because definition sets are only influenced by definitions in other processes at the end (or beginning) of a process. Therefore definitions is lost if they are present at a synchronization point within the process but overwritten before the end of the process.
Our approach is based around adapting a Reaching Definitions analysis (along the lines of [9] ) to the setting of VHDL 1 . A novel feature of our analysis is that it has two components for tracking the flow of values of active signals: one is the traditional over-approximation whereas the other is an under-approximation. The first step of the Information Flow analysis determines the local dependencies for each statement; this takes the form of an inference system that is local to each process. The second step constructs the directed graph by performing the necessary "transitive closure"; this takes the form of a constraint system and makes use of the Reaching Definitions analysis. The results obtained are therefore more precise than those obtained by more standard methods like that of Kemmerer [8] and only ignore issues like timing and power-consumption. The analysis is presented in Section 5 and has been implemented in the Succinct Solver Version 1.0 [10, 11] and has been used to validate several programs for implementing the NSA Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [17] .
Background
VHDL 1 is a fragment of VHDL that concentrates on the behavioral specification of models. A program in VHDL 1 consists of entities and architectures, uniquely identified by indexes i e , i a ∈ Id. An entity describes how an architecture is connected to the environment. The architectures comprise the behavioral or structural specification of the entities.
An entity specifies a set of signals referred to as ports (prt ∈ P rt), each port is represented by a signal (s ∈ Sig) used for reference in the specification of the architecture; furthermore a notion of the intended usage of the signal is specified by the keywords in and out defining if the signals value can be altered or read by the environment, and the type of the signal's value (either logical values or vectors of logical values).
